Zhu, J; Shi, Q; Zhang, C; Yuan, J; Li, Q and Wang, X (2024) Investigating cooperative strategies in low-carbon public-private partnership projects through evolutionary game. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 31(2), pp. 789-811. ISSN 0969-9988
Abstract
Purpose: Promoting low-carbon in the construction industry is important for achieving the overall low-carbon goals. Public–private partnership is very popular in public infrastructure projects. However, different perceptions of low-carbon and behaviors of public and private sectors can hinder the realization of low-carbon in these projects. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to cooperate towards low-carbon goals, an evolutionary game model is constructed. Design/methodology/approach: An evolutionary game model that considers the opportunistic behavior of the participants is developed. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) under different scenarios are examined, and the factors that influence the willingness to cooperate between the government and private investors are investigated. Findings: The results illustrate that a well-designed system of profit distribution and subsidies can enhance collaboration. Excessive subsidies have negative impact on cooperation between the two sides, because these two sides can weaken income distribution and lead to the free-riding behavior of the government. Under the situation of two ESSs, there is also an optimal revenue distribution coefficient that maximizes the probability of cooperation. With the introduction of supervision and punishment mechanism, the opportunistic behavior of private investors is effectively constrained. Originality/value: An evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector in the field of low-carbon construction. Based on the analysis of the model, this paper summarizes the conditions and strategies that can enable the two sectors to cooperate.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | evolutionary game; low-carbon; opportunistic behavior; PPP projects |
| Index terms: | strategy, revenue, profit, cooperation, methodology, collaboration, low-carbon construction, partnership, private sector, public sector, investor, subsidy, public infrastructure, construction industry, evolutionary game, supervision, income, opportunistic behaviour |
| Subjects: | business, control systems, sustainability and energy, psychology, economic analysis, research methods, management, sociology, partnership management, economic theory, infrastructure and transport systems, industry analysis, administrative law |
| Topics: | Organizational Design, Legal Issues, Stakeholder Management, Sustainability, Business Strategy, Engineering Principles, Project Management, Research Practice |
| Descriptive scope: | 3 PCT |
N.B. Descriptive scope is a count of how many of the five facets of empirical research are indicated by the words used in title, abstract and keywords. It is not intended as a judgement on the research; merely a count of the kind of word we would expect to indicate Phenomenon, Concepts, Theoretical framing, Empirical techniques, Analytical techniques. If all five are present, then a code of “5 PCTEA” will indicate this. If you feel the coding for this record is questionable, we welcome discussion around the terms we matched or the way we categorized them. The facet you would expect may not be coded, or a facet may be coded inappropriately. This can also bear on a larger question, of which facets should be treated as defining in construction management research. Please get in touch, and we will look at it. More details here