Stenbeck, T (2008) Quantifying effects of incentives in a rail maintenance performance-based contract. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 134(4), pp. 265-272. ISSN 0733-9364
Abstract
Methods to quantify and evaluate quality become important when lump sum and performance contracts replace traditional unit-price or cost-plus contracts. Here, a combined graphical and mathematical method is described along with its results when applied on a Swedish rail maintenance contract with incentives. The regression analysis tools in the Excel software were used. The result of the incentives was that train delay decreased about 10% and the number of technical errors decreased about 20%. The improved quality took place without cost increase. The good relation between the owner and the contractor did not suffer from the rise of efficiency. On the contrary, it was improved. With minor modifications and clarifications the owner now intends to use it for in-house contracting, as the case studied, as well as when outsourcing to private companies. With other performance indicators, the elaborated method and lessons learned should be applicable also for other sectors, where a contractor assuring a specified service level during a period of time is paid a bonus depending on degree of fulfillment.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | contract management; contracts; incentives; maintenance; monitoring; quality control; railroad engineering |
| Index terms: | cost increase, lessons learned, contract management, performance indicator, maintenance contract, monitoring, regression analysis, quality control, performance-based contract, cost-plus, outsourcing, efficiency, owner |
| Subjects: | project delivery, contractual arrangements, control systems, business, statistical analysis, sociology, contract management, professional development, economics, performance management, maintenance engineering |
| Topics: | Quality Management, Contract Administration, Site Management, Research Practice, Information Management, Cost Management, Business Strategy, Procurement, Stakeholder Management |
| Descriptive scope: | 3 PCA |
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