Application of voting theory to the float ownership problem

A longstanding contentious question in construction scheduling is who owns float: the owner or general contractor. Float is the ability of scheduled activities to absorb delays by their flexible timing. Zero float is considered to constitute criticality. This definition creates a fundamental but largely ignored paradox: To mitigate risk, critical activities urgently need float, but by definition are given none. Yet consuming float can reduce local delays to prevent a ripple effect of negative consequences. This research revisits the float ownership problem with inspiration from voting theory, which can provide proven approaches that apportion a limited valuable good among several participants of different sizes. Equivalent concepts in voting and scheduling were extracted and aligned to derive a functioning approach. Performance of such float apportionment was visualized and quantified by how efficiently the new method protects against delays, both in terms of counts and periods, and when saturation occurs. It was validated by simulating all combinations of a substantial benchmark schedule. The initial question was thus revised to who should use float to minimize overall risk.