Construction workers' unsafe behavior contagion under government-contractor dual influence

Despite efforts to prevent and correct unsafe behavior on construction sites, such behavior persists among construction workers. Much of what makes unsafe behavior so difficult to eradicate is its contagious nature. The contagion pattern of unsafe behavior is not only based on the group characteristics of construction workers but also influenced by government regulatory agencies (GRA) and general contractors (GC). In this study, we established a contagion model of construction workers' unsafe behavior based on group-level factors and the dual influence of GRA and GC and employed evolutionary game theory and epidemic models to explore the contagion patterns and interventions of unsafe behavior. We find that, although the strong and weak regulation strategies by GRA suppress the contagion of unsafe behavior, the strong regulation strategy exhibits a better preventive effect; further, the active management strategies by GC have a dampening effect on the contagion of unsafe behavior and vice versa, enhanced perceived social benefits of GRA prevent unsafe behavior more than enhanced perceived image loss, and a high degree of group identity perception effectively inhibits the contagion of unsafe behavior when construction workers have relatively high levels of safety awareness. By portraying the contagion state of construction workers' unsafe behavior in actual situations, this study provides a theoretical basis for the decision-making of GRA and GC and helps to improve the work efficiency of GRA as well as the safety management level of GC.