On whom the toll falls: A model of network financing

Levinson, D M (1998) On whom the toll falls: A model of network financing. PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, USA.

Abstract

This dissertation examines why and how jurisdictions choose to finance their roads. The systematic causes of revenue choice are explored qualitatively by examining the history of turnpikes. The question is approached analytically by employing game theory to model revenue choice on a long road. The road is covered by a series of jurisdictions seeking to maximize local welfare. Jurisdictions are responsible for building and maintaining the local network. Complexity arises because local network users may not be local residents, and local residents may use non-local networks. Key factors posited to explain the choice of revenue mechanism include the length of trips using the road, the size of the governing jurisdiction, the degree of excludability, and the transaction costs of toll collection. These factors dictate the size and scope of the free rider problem. It is hypothesized that smaller jurisdictions and lower collection costs favor tolling policies over taxes. The analytical model is operationalized by assuming jurisdictions have two decisions: the strategic decision to tax or toll, and the tactical decision of setting the rate of tax or toll. Models of user demand as a function of trip distance and monetary cost and of network costs as a function of traffic flow and the number of toll collections are specified. The values of the constants and coefficients of the model are developed from recent cost literature and the estimation of a model of collection costs from California Toll Bridge data. The model is applied to evaluate the dissertation's hypotheses. The application evaluates the welfare implications of a jurisdiction and its neighbors imposing general tax, cordon toll, odometer tax, or perfect toll policies. Sensitivity tests of the model under alternative behavioral assumptions, and with varying model coefficients are conducted. Finally, policy implications from the analysis are drawn. The general trends which bode well for road pricing (electronic toll collection (ETC), decentralization, advanced infrastructure, privatization, and federal rules) are established. Possible scenarios for three cases are presented: deploying ETC and building new toll roads and converting free roads.

Item Type: Thesis (Doctoral)
Thesis advisor: Hansen, M M
Uncontrolled Keywords: complexity; game theory; bridge; traffic; financing; policy; pricing; privatization; transaction cost
Index terms: policy implication, dissertation, privatization, traffic flow, estimation, falls, decentralization, pricing, financing, complexity, analytical model, history, toll, game theory, jurisdiction, revenue, transaction cost
Subjects: research dissemination and communication, policy studies, legal systems, financial and cost management, architectural and construction history, decision models, economic analysis, theoretical framing, health risk and incident analysis, transportation engineering, systems engineering, financial analysis, political science
Topics: Legal Issues, Governance, Research Practice, Engineering Principles, Cost Management, Business Strategy, Health and Safety
Descriptive scope: 3 PCT

N.B. Descriptive scope is a count of how many of the five facets of empirical research are indicated by the words used in title, abstract and keywords. It is not intended as a judgement on the research; merely a count of the kind of word we would expect to indicate Phenomenon, Concepts, Theoretical framing, Empirical techniques, Analytical techniques. If all five are present, then a code of “5 PCTEA” will indicate this. If you feel the coding for this record is questionable, we welcome discussion around the terms we matched or the way we categorized them. The facet you would expect may not be coded, or a facet may be coded inappropriately. This can also bear on a larger question, of which facets should be treated as defining in construction management research. Please get in touch, and we will look at it. More details here