Game theory applications in construction project management

Construction project management is a dynamic and complex system with plenty of unpredictable issues, which directly affect the cost increases, project delays, product quality, or even relationships of parties. It is necessary to investigate methods and techniques that can prevent and reduce those issues effectively. Therefore, the objective of this dissertation is to explore advanced models to solve the current problems such as the unfairness of sharing resources, the ineffectiveness of using contract float, the conflict of interest of concurrent delays, and the selection of delivery bid methods. Inspired by the diverse characteristics of game theory, this dissertation is conducted by adopting game theory in four applications. First, due to the lack of ultimate resource sharing techniques to fairly allocate costs and benefits to participants, the proposed model is constructed by singularity function and cooperative game theory that may sharelimited resources and fairly split payoffs. The study also helps parties create an innovative and robust method to obtain stable cooperation and optimal outcomes. The second application is produced when the ineffectiveness of using contract float causes late, over budget, and unqualified projects. Hence, the float trading game using the Nash bargaining solution concept is suggested, which allows subcontractors to sell and buy float. The result is such an innovative float solvingmethod that subcontractors could optimize gains and losses; it also creates a fair and positive working environment to accomplish the project on time. There is no existing consistent concurrent delay analysis method that satisfies the expectations of owners, contractors, and subcontractors. The third application is studied to develop a comprehensive model where the technique allows the integration of incentive bonuses and liquidated damages. The outcome demonstrates fairness to all parties where the early subcontractor may still earn extra profit. Since the lowest price bid method obtains many potential risks, such as submitting unrealistically low prices and changing orders causing delayed completion and cost overrun, two alternative models are presented to assist owners to select qualified contractors in an aggressive market. The study may determine the probability of project winning for bidders and their expected payoffs.