Developing incentive mechanisms for long-term and short-term technological innovation in major engineering projects using principal-agent theory

Zhu, J; Chen, J; Jin, W and Li, Q (2025) Developing incentive mechanisms for long-term and short-term technological innovation in major engineering projects using principal-agent theory. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 32(3), pp. 1947-1969. ISSN 0969-9988

Abstract

Purpose: Promoting technological innovation is important to address the complexity of major engineering challenges. Technological innovations include short-term innovations at the project level and long-term innovations that can enhance competitive advantages. The purpose of this study is to develop an incentive mechanism for the public sector that considers short-term and long-term efforts from the private sector, aiming to promote technological innovation in major engineering projects. Design/methodology/approach: This study constructs an incentive model considering the differences in short-term and long-term innovation efforts from the private sector. This model emphasizes the spillover effect of long-term efforts on current projects and the cost synergy effect between short-term and long-term efforts. It also explores the factors influencing the optimal incentive strategies for the public sector and innovation strategies for the private sector. Findings: The results indicate that increasing the output coefficient of short-term and long-term efforts and reducing the cost coefficient not only enhance the innovation efforts of the private sector but also prompt the public sector to increase the incentive coefficient. The spillover effect of long-term innovation efforts and the synergy effect of the two efforts are positively related to the incentive coefficient for the public sector. Originality/value: This research addresses the existing gap in understanding how the public sector should devise incentive mechanisms for technological innovation when contractors acting as the private sector are responsible for construction within a public-private partnership (PPP) model. In constructing the incentive mechanism model, this study incorporates the private sector's short-term efforts at the project level and their long-term efforts for sustained corporate development, thus adding considerable practical significance.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: incentive mechanisms; major engineering projects; PPP model; technological innovation
Index terms: synergy, innovation strategy, technological innovation, public sector, partnership, private sector, competitive advantage, complexity, agent, methodology, strategy
Subjects: market analysis, research methods, innovation and technology management, practitioner, partnership management, administrative law, industry analysis, systems engineering, management, business
Topics: Engineering Principles, Legal Issues, Research Practice, Business Strategy, Roles and Professions, Stakeholder Management
Descriptive scope: 3 PCT

N.B. Descriptive scope is a count of how many of the five facets of empirical research are indicated by the words used in title, abstract and keywords. It is not intended as a judgement on the research; merely a count of the kind of word we would expect to indicate Phenomenon, Concepts, Theoretical framing, Empirical techniques, Analytical techniques. If all five are present, then a code of “5 PCTEA” will indicate this. If you feel the coding for this record is questionable, we welcome discussion around the terms we matched or the way we categorized them. The facet you would expect may not be coded, or a facet may be coded inappropriately. This can also bear on a larger question, of which facets should be treated as defining in construction management research. Please get in touch, and we will look at it. More details here