Optimizing the regulation of commercial real estate presale deposits: The role of third-party regulation and the design of government incentives

Fan, C; Li, X and Li, H (2024) Optimizing the regulation of commercial real estate presale deposits: The role of third-party regulation and the design of government incentives. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 150(10): 04024143, ISSN 0733-9364

Abstract

In recent years, the outbreak of mass loan suspension by homebuyers in China has triggered widespread concern about the regulation of presale deposits for commercial real estate. To optimize the supervision mechanism of presale deposits, the regulatory role of third-party institutions is being considered by local governments. However, the efficacy of third-party regulatory mechanisms is not guaranteed, and rent-seeking behaviors driven by substantial profits may lead to mechanism failures. By constructing evolutionary game models and analyzing system equilibriums under both administrative and third-party regulatory modes, this study investigates the effectiveness of introducing third-party institutions into the regulation of presale deposits for commercial real estate, proposes suggestions to mitigate developer speculative behavior and addresses the design challenges of local government optimal incentive contracts. Findings indicate that under the administrative regulatory mode, overly strict government regulation may inadvertently enhance the covert nature of developer speculation. The introduction of third parties effectively substitutes for government regulation and better suppresses developer speculative motives. In the setting of incentive mechanisms, the intensities of rewards and penalties need to satisfy different optimal solution relationships based on varying initial conditions. When establishing performance evaluation standards, governments should consider the magnitude of reward and penalty intensities to enhance the quality of third-party regulation. Specifically, when reward intensity exceeds penalty intensity, lowering performance evaluation standards is more conducive to achieving the ideal equilibrium of the system. Conversely, raising performance evaluation standards yields superior results. This study provides a comprehensive theoretical analysis and practical recommendations for the regulation of presale deposits in commercial real estate.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: evolutionary game theory; government incentive mechanisms; presale deposits regulation; speculative behavior; third-party supervision
Index terms: local government, evolutionary game, government regulation, outbreak, effectiveness, regulation, commercial real estate, incentive contract, penalty, profit, China, motive, performance evaluation, supervision
Subjects: economic analysis, control systems, political science, Geography, economic theory, health risk and incident analysis, administrative law, health safety and environment, performance management, contractual arrangements, regulatory law, real estate economics, performance measurement, psychology
Topics: Governance, Geographical Context, Business Strategy, Human Resources, Quality Management, Project Management, Health and Safety, Research Practice, Legal Issues, Procurement, Urban Studies
Descriptive scope: 3 PCT

N.B. Descriptive scope is a count of how many of the five facets of empirical research are indicated by the words used in title, abstract and keywords. It is not intended as a judgement on the research; merely a count of the kind of word we would expect to indicate Phenomenon, Concepts, Theoretical framing, Empirical techniques, Analytical techniques. If all five are present, then a code of “5 PCTEA” will indicate this. If you feel the coding for this record is questionable, we welcome discussion around the terms we matched or the way we categorized them. The facet you would expect may not be coded, or a facet may be coded inappropriately. This can also bear on a larger question, of which facets should be treated as defining in construction management research. Please get in touch, and we will look at it. More details here