Jiang, W.; Wang, A.; Tao, M.; Ni, F. and Zhang, L. (2026) Collaborative emission reduction behavior in the construction supply chain with incentive mechanism: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, pp. 1-33. ISSN 0969-9988
Abstract
Purpose – The construction supply chain balances economic and environmental benefits via low-carbon operations, yet uneven cost-benefit distribution among stakeholders hinders emission reduction efforts. This study examines stakeholder incentives and decision-making to advance low-carbon transformation. Design/methodology/approach – This study employs the method of evolutionary game theory. As strategies adapt dynamically to external changes, we construct a government-supplier-manufacturer evolutionary game model, analyzing equilibrium strategies and key parameter impacts. Findings – Findings reveal: (1) Government subsidies have a nonlinear threshold effect, and exceeding the optimal range will lead to a decline in policy efficiency and a decline in supervisory motivation. (2) The penalty mechanism is more robust than the incentive measures, and plays an irreplaceable and fundamental role in setting the bottom line for emission reduction and guiding system coordination. (3) Negative public supervision is a powerful force driving strict government supervision, and its effectiveness is significantly better than positive publicity. Originality/value – This study has clear implications for current environmental policies. Its conclusions challenge the traditional idea of over-reliance on fiscal subsidies and demonstrate the necessity and effectiveness of shifting the policy focus to build a constraint governance framework with "strict supervision and information disclosure" as the core.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | collaborative emission reduction; construction supply chain; decision-making behavior; incentive mechanism; tripartite evolutionary game |
| Index terms: | decision-making, transformation, environmental policy, manufacturer, subsidy, strategy, methodology, effectiveness, coordination, evolutionary game, efficiency, penalty, motivation, supervision, governance, construction supply chain |
| Subjects: | management, economic theory, research methods, construction logistics, regulatory law, business, economic analysis, control systems, psychology, practitioner, performance management, decision analysis, public policy |
| Topics: | Organizational Design, Project Management, Research Practice, Quality Management, Legal Issues, Risk Management, Supply Chain Management, Governance, Roles and Professions, Human Resources, Business Strategy |
| Descriptive scope: | 3 PCT |
N.B. Descriptive scope is a count of how many of the five facets of empirical research are indicated by the words used in title, abstract and keywords. It is not intended as a judgement on the research; merely a count of the kind of word we would expect to indicate Phenomenon, Concepts, Theoretical framing, Empirical techniques, Analytical techniques. If all five are present, then a code of “5 PCTEA” will indicate this. If you feel the coding for this record is questionable, we welcome discussion around the terms we matched or the way we categorized them. The facet you would expect may not be coded, or a facet may be coded inappropriately. This can also bear on a larger question, of which facets should be treated as defining in construction management research. Please get in touch, and we will look at it. More details here